Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2bd8fa62e0270138…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

80.5 KB First seen: 2023-01-20
MD5: 4f0e4d154fea0988a62e715dd385cf70 SHA-1: 284b0f07258ccebd0ab1d7721746a9af3c513bc0 SHA-256: 2bd8fa62e0270138ea034a724060953ff24a52cd86e5c10c841c102d1350cc35
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vulnerability vector. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common social engineering tactic. This suggests the document is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004ded.bin
a4e533c020c7ce818ac32b7c9dbcc2a3d838b4760c9dc993b3ad0c07b323e4e8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4DED 1588 bytes