Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 2bd4647661a8f61c

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1000.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-22

MD5: 6c34930bafeb756dd9ad58d0b72c46aa SHA-1: 70f4c94b0ef2f2d8fdc93a7bf9a9d2f6bdfed8a4 SHA-256: 2bd4647661a8f61c642f4ad17704145f8cc518ec14bee0ade04084ae2775c373

150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of an OLE object containing this exploit payload strongly suggests the file is designed to deliver a secondary malicious payload upon opening. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is generic spreadsheet data.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR

Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ECX) high SC_GETPC_CALL

x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ECX)
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`ole10native_00.bin` `c711cdcb99640da705d7dd9a89b098848aef88b14492e2158204acb1128d8be2`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD011ACDA0/oLe10naTIVE	1521 bytes

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