RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2bd2b5a44a645184

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.7 KB

MD5: ca08afc75b2b74bc87663b2af0c53d55 SHA-1: f2bcfa267be90302db50f807aa03954f56de26de SHA-256: 2bd2b5a44a6451840ab0f820f08f2eed0f1763711b0e0427fb4d0579e6603fa2

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data. Heuristic firings indicate the presence of an automatically linked OLE object and an exploit targeting the Equation Editor. The ".objupdate" directive suggests that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The specific exploit used points to a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000eba.bin` `55f6909551916ea926b8ce892e5064c87ad93aa8809cb2eac90ce5fcc390e7c5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xEBA	1625 bytes

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