Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2bc8024b438c3728…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.2 KB Created: 2020-10-25 23:36:40 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 6ece2234fb1d84ca85a19cc74e0932ca SHA-1: 7302effcfdd1ed91f74bdfe3b1cf2574761732f9 SHA-256: 2bc8024b438c3728f4238ab10f7b1f2c1b0ea946a90d7e2907912a4218c681c2
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting and are designed to appear as free online tools. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting a phishing or scam attempt. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious verdict.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=convertir+pdf+en+jpg+online+gratis In PDF document text
    • https://daletutanedura.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636587/xemuwuxevakomaj-vefajak-zeraki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://walinakonefal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316097/2957439.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetuxabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/sefufizodofok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodipewelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637384/tewazol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zavomafig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134356936/magijujiku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pamaridefudeluz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776324/bofujosipixamepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jugoruzaja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407370/4647236.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bavejojonosepes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380601/wiwodepogurojofepotu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://poxobavu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453713/wepoza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369654/normal_5f8d22f085718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368982/normal_5f93947b80aca.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xekixudag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134336078/c15a2c371143a7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dotofinadi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740455/8926815.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bogemokized.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134386998/13e48f35014.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xalipifizipig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379045/6a23c1c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://putigazabikikim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682718/varimosugiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/2011/4331/files/the_diamond_of_darkhold.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/3227/5865/files/90986242784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/8602/8193/files/82177870191.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4657ad7c-e8de-43ae-974f-8074da6c4f16/84439007171.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d1f2141d-8e1e-437d-8d97-831c85adaa57/sozigutudavenedafedamura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000058dd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x58DD 5248 bytes
SHA-256: dae4b456fce209093d30b0d3952186364266a2ef7aad31c801d78462379e49af
font_01_sfnt_off00006ad5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6AD5 10316 bytes
SHA-256: 8fe51eff0e2641be2e0be7963ccea54371d50ea49a7a5a85c6be1e1476698863