Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2bc2cbb71966569c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.1 KB Created: 2021-08-10 04:00:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: 55b0cb663f61134761b152744034b670 SHA-1: d80d87d84a1ce4fe7540dc8e19be0842168e83cd SHA-256: 2bc2cbb71966569c0fe5305f56183e5298f99c51373e641fd2fbdd2c8a4393a1
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF document flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, specifically as a phishing trojan. It contains a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting an attempt to distribute further malicious content or phish users. The presence of embedded URLs and the heuristic indicating a QR code lure further support a phishing or malware distribution attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://irlanc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=problemas+y+ejercicios+de+analisis+matematico+berman+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://extreamtuning.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160748e85585d0---kegefitepunalago.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://408of53crownstreet.com/assets/media/files/77595725188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ganan10.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cc7944cf585---wifemumadifimupujer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://foire-fromages-et-vins.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609c2bcfb6c34---luraribisogixina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ever0036.com/assets/uploads/ckedit/files/20210615153735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://davidhammerstein.org/userfiles/file/dagedexeweludibivufepipif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.petercar0937494634.com/upload/img/files/tegorej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nsdadventist.org/FCKData/file/48004401659.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://balticstroy.com/uploads/files/watusuzenivix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.espymetcalf.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608bc401030be---xirabejari.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cerescommoditiesltd.com/Images_upload/files/buwivarivepejafaxif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://psihodesk.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xefig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ewms.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c4vsjdfdqbsos51ghvh4ff9rjv/93703229314.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://deurenhanger.nl/userfiles/file/55447800993.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brunagabriele.it/userfiles/files/nonapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://orourkelawoffice.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/biwatutunaxogixulufavi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hondamienbac.vn/userfiles/file/58527549957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://heydarbaba.org/resimler/files/tirilelezuzovene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://specialbrands.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2f9de3bcc372b45b0ce418f15ec4dff5/kunusebotexerudadizuligo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://esteticarcare.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/48f9ec5301cee9e945a6f8b000a48fdb/74446623974.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.deopendeur.org/imgUser/file/mupusixogiwiwugetopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cb88.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCB88 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000e39f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE39F 11168 bytes
SHA-256: 83b51a7f7c73ac5bfb578e120e29e3dff9e1e3fd448ed8f806d3f4a035d31fb7
font_02_sfnt_off0000fd7c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD7C 17896 bytes
SHA-256: 7d487f9ccc769e283e138c17bbe793c9537ada43cfdb05920acaa9a528f51082

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