Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2bb702fa9c570cf8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.50 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-24
MD5: 1fa352a29faa3208848df1ebfab936df SHA-1: 49ce40d159b32fdd6c64d68ffc755c16d6009fec SHA-256: 2bb702fa9c570cf870cd00bb8b21706e08f5eca79c1e768e8ac7a454acbc4725
372 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, when opened, links directly to a suspicious URL. The ClamAV detection name further supports its classification as a downloader.

Heuristics 10

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
14c3fcd1c9e393802a3e93e9b5707a89920ce8a5249792523a51680015673175		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0006F714/OLe10nATiVE 1269 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005c200.pdf
ccbdec2ae20918ff16b6bf0da4b061401a26cc97dfc863bdce09c08c8c5cf702		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5C200 1197568 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
ed984836f5540235b764b40347dbd6f4ed0332c0d984b183f02923aee56d68a5		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1570304 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
de25893cf76e2ff95eb8117a818e318a1f882b655040c19429a0e8375e073c18		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1548800 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00019000.pdf
e3fd1a0636056082fcc7a59e535b7628816a00ff4d98612b7e0e4951515f5648		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x19000 1472512 bytes

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