Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b89b110fe97434e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.9 KB
MD5: 9e62ad41e257d020ca7a2bc3b749c5a1 SHA-1: e8df365efb5137ec31d2cef187b4f5d5ae81df2b SHA-256: 2b89b110fe97434efaa09a187122950dc9ea43100fd3a700ee7b71a1c29e61ce
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened. The presence of `EQUaTIoN.3` as the class further confirms the exploit vector. The attack pattern is therefore a malicious document leveraging a known Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000f3.bin
190a39d6decc5652bdbb24308b1e051fc65dda9d24cb96ac5988ba98d2522f13		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF3 2148 bytes

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