Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b8851486069b84d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.3 KB Created: 2020-06-14 22:04:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2855cb390380f9d26ab9de03dcb79839 SHA-1: 9ee3f028f97b1652f377d7a9e3371ed13e960e66 SHA-256: 2b8851486069b84d265f2386b78698ca913e9f44afc4315e4c4f5d539082bc0e
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to other PDF files on different domains. This behavior is indicative of SEO poisoning or a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the suspicious link farm activity. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack vector appears to be the embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mta-sts.burritocraft.co.nz/uploads/1/3/0/5/130589098/130589098.html#how+would+you+go+about+planning+a+lesson
    • http://mail.thesoundlab.org.uk/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639812/6502422.pdf
    • http://midnightdad.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621412/9125094.pdf
    • http://everestdevelopment.net/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483047/faginanuxewotuw.pdf
    • http://coachpraktijktexel.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130488476/lugatoxopako-vijubuj.pdf
    • http://cherishedmoon.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437867/1000970.pdf
    • http://palominofarm.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621393/latepelewunezewo.pdf
    • https://wilosuvisak.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/76664109759.pdf
    • https://gizedaresudi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/71079681924.pdf
    • https://musepig.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tesisuninipada.pdf
    • https://padofaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nojesedinepojidiwanufomuj.pdf
    • https://badupegenum.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/61932968762.pdf
    • https://jopawetudame.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/12901078497.pdf
    • https://sosunilavef.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/73883094966.pdf
    • https://zifenopi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/rikogifemizozozopazur.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000072c3.bin
864b3e5e315a993253cd68630eba72ad633f92fbc2751dfcb8b79556d19e7a92
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72C3 10064 bytes