Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b7a64ed0a2dadd2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

16.1 KB
MD5: fb208af452e321ed012eace482707b3e SHA-1: f43e7aea7cc2f5f7d708cb11525f229d1dceafad SHA-256: 2b7a64ed0a2dadd22acdc0394118dc32744e6e6b524a3bc024b4c6209d68c8fd
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic firings. The presence of OLE object data (RTF_OBJDATA) further supports this. The primary attack vector appears to be exploiting this vulnerability to achieve code execution, likely for the purpose of downloading and executing a subsequent stage. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bdc.bin
a41c90d3f48201593635960563e1a1406c2566154e3f56951141b607cbf65f35
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDC 1739 bytes