Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b6e10eb86ff3ab6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.2 KB Created: 2020-10-24 14:33:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-17
MD5: dca9ac985c4bd66faea0dc4b69abd1b0 SHA-1: bd1211796cb7f407c3a59f6576db005e51e83692 SHA-256: 2b6e10eb86ff3ab6f45b5fef8583c3dc0a8bb61cc9faeaf7b9c5d92625759218
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/wb?keyword=microsoft%20word%20guide%20book%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378393/normal_5f8c832314ea7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376404/normal_5f92d2aa33436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377905/normal_5f930e3335bfd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374198/normal_5f8eab0f8af32.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vunixumo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453253/318241.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefamojugibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164519/e0fc91114e2e750.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vefavufarexuba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315694/81d18c180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekubuzebebam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739705/vazew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bewapuvin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453684/funiju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jamafijuzu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437216/6706996.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://papunagaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384156/malegufom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366402/normal_5f889c079eed5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365525/normal_5f8a6ecbd7145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/7084/3797/files/instructions_for_completing_form_i-485.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5970/7037/files/15483330529.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1917/2000/files/14571147189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/9191/3624/files/14336162740.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/6239/4517/files/very_hard_cooking_games.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4c44e8bd-9de9-450a-90f6-b09b0156b12c/43246914169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/47fded78-bccb-4c81-9045-ae662643e403/7821396577.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000054a4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x54A4 5160 bytes
SHA-256: c30102cfca1037c6d02250123683cbd554e6d1efdbbdffd0b2f717f8a44696b9
font_01_sfnt_off0000665c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x665C 10288 bytes
SHA-256: 4478d0b18a614cc8c168c8b9a76f4b1a67f52983415ea36b8c70f1c4a924fd6d
font_02_sfnt_off0000898f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x898F 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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