Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b3fb1ff7f2b867d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

71.1 KB First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 2e25eed46b3d7077837f4268b46a6f82 SHA-1: 8d417dc5bd24d9ce798abde5f995755c749093c8 SHA-256: 2b3fb1ff7f2b867d632e7835e2ff82deac4c61af3ec2c88e137a73bd1020a6cb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, hence the high confidence in exploitation for client execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001837.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1837 1817 bytes
SHA-256: 365a90c73671452df2ffe4accc503619e82e7111a3929c7b2676b8b7c3f7fc3b

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