RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2b3be3d9308f122b

MALICIOUS

RTF

107.9 KB First seen: 2023-01-18

MD5: 21d012858e03a602093d0992ee04a363 SHA-1: 75c2e61b108977f16ab48ca2cdf451d0bdb0486f SHA-256: 2b3be3d9308f122bf86d6749d11e0024f8585d81e45c56e9f5b93db7fadd328a

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known technique for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces the OLE object to activate, triggering the exploit. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of malicious code.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005a84.bin` `5498fff4692da01d2976166f2fc5b50fd7ecbfb9f6e605e3a04dd17f893fecd6`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5A84	1771 bytes

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