Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b256ba2dcd342d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB
MD5: 0aca152b851ac178865e88df2873fd84 SHA-1: 5913f4aa490f5bafd15d8e4f5bf5b4f80ea4c7d3 SHA-256: 2b256ba2dcd342d028468ea228853778c6402b05cf758dc13ce5801569e9e52e
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious PDF T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

The sample is a PDF file that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. The PDF contains embedded script payloads, indicating an attempt to execute malicious code upon opening. The script logic, though partially obfuscated, suggests the execution of a second-stage payload. The presence of XFA forms and the specific CVE points to a known exploit vector for PDF-based attacks.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
b18c7faeadfb1a97bb51845b7c5fdcdc4d6c4ba835d5bc8538f44c6d11784fc2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 80350 bytes