Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2af0af11b70df158…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

270.7 KB Created: 2018-04-28 18:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2019-01-11
MD5: 93868076fcf3e204c9af69f258407f61 SHA-1: b77665e8a8652880f48e6041dadd74e6fcee0ab7 SHA-256: 2af0af11b70df15865dcec9c36bef39edfc00737fe419dc88936d0ae849cb64c
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1137.001 Office Application Startup: DLL Search Order Hijacking

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object with indicators of a payload. Heuristics indicate this is likely an exploitation attempt, specifically referencing CVE-2026-21514, and that the embedded object is an executable. The document's purpose is to deliver and execute this payload upon opening.

Heuristics 3

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 300544 bytes
SHA-256: 9e462894d975d52fa8ea5feeefe7e64128986fbb662d97c4a69d4b415155506a
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 295155 bytes
SHA-256: 817d5dc3c31146b00f8c9a0284362a8319721c4727befeaae32347f4da932755
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 39fd9eb2858edef01886678f3abeae4ab5822a4e2ae49ddc3fe2e7fc81c8f0fc