Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ad023023501f9ca…

MALICIOUS

PDF

166.6 KB Created: 2021-07-23 21:24:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 3f424b8d53cc09624fe163d751f11515 SHA-1: cebf5e6d9bbb09472f962cd16a50097d64aca5d2 SHA-256: 2ad023023501f9ca3166fac571333662da1ef9becb5db1206ad6c76b4899ecd9
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to multiple compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting an attempt to host and distribute malicious files. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the structure and URL findings point to a phishing or downloader attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9943

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://minutesnap.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f6cd454ab477a1f824d8092d055d1416/tolobok.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://trucraftsmanship.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160847fc765baa---824679237.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.marthatrotts.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adb658e5877---95430267216.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://englewoodgrassfarm.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c0d428348feb2aed126c21c8c242096d/44178958563.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ajur.rest/uploads/userfiles/file/jagasitefuvovedexegegeta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paintingservicesonline.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b571908b8bf---nuxid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tectrongim.com/uploads/files/nujanopegowumuxebeniwomej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amagi.la/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160dfbb10df5a9---jakijugavovuwilajinipogek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://galettedesrois.hu/userfiles/file/55414855071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tantecoccole016.it/file/pabeligig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thaide.org/userfiles/file/24967135905.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bauarch.bg/files/xipakejaxabex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://raunlarose.us/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090fec3d39cc---42530633098.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://n95america.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2357ed39e80f31c93099bd3bbd58b72b/53052719440.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://provia-events.de/pics/fotos/1/file/wavakotafepeliteraxisa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://newo.ru/files/files/bepunekozonupefalag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wurbs-hanau.de/userfiles/file/pakizawakolen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.wikiwebagency.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fcd6ca0f67cfd92dd60b3d431d3d6c4a/84289901450.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xlux.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fhjjtke2ukf42t8s5ek6tr9bvr/rojobapim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://payassistinc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c540985ce5---jazereruluzenoluloxifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.caslyn.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081eb852f819---35526634549.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jyotiacademicpress.org/uploads/file/44023821572.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://scissortailfarms.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608dac6198e48---nitopu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bilagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085d72be41df---42053910415.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=dixie+chopper+service+manual+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000221f2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x221F2 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00023a04.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x23A04 21472 bytes
SHA-256: 1613d3e14e773ebe7b18c4b9034a6a014622cc0f001936176e5634bd35db8fd7
font_02_sfnt_off000271df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x271DF 11056 bytes
SHA-256: cd62321659d5cd78b171b9dbacb274aa869c192926ccd9c3bf5c30a763921686

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