Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ac1e0280afcb7d9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.04 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-24
MD5: 3c4828f7ab55b5b0084a6f028ca9c9a0 SHA-1: 9d783be88f5acf4dfac837c8619ff66b9c7d5c65 SHA-256: 2ac1e0280afcb7d90c2695c788aa0c7187ffe8b9ecad336c1916b9fcaaadff77
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing a malicious Equation Editor OLE object. Static analysis identified a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of this vulnerability for arbitrary code execution. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is minimal, suggesting the primary attack vector is the embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
3d925796bc8c74dc8c2e27516a6b3ea9aae344b4945804d1c8c9072ee3f9ed1e
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0065DBB8/olE10NATiVe 2004 bytes