Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ab2def5a5e28ada…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.4 KB Created: 2020-08-24 07:55:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5650540ea4b64e4ab646eb9f80b65c6d SHA-1: afd3c3627e4b1bc2bd47422e2d4496e6cfcf6957 SHA-256: 2ab2def5a5e28ada19aa8b7ff6c5058066910ded67f19048a2d27728bc093cc4
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains embedded links, one of which points to a known malicious redirector at 'ttraff.com'. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text suggesting it is a 'quiz answer key', which aligns with the 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic. The primary attack vector appears to be social engineering through a deceptive document, directing users to a malicious URL.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=everfi+module+4+final+quiz+answers
    • http://bodikapuz.dateworks.co/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302780/muvuvorajibumaw.pdf
    • http://sidugaza.marshallterrace.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739344/kowezobotilajolaj.pdf
    • http://zigepoz.newlifenaturalhealth.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740405/panolil.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3966/1986/files/tubek.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9774/2750/files/mefizejifuzabunagetuzuvow.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9213/0458/files/vekexadewupuwa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7812/3680/files/integral_calculus.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1689/5133/files/kawanenu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1243/1778/files/soxudekenasalibamas.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7482/1019/files/pukifosuxorukeduf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2060/6885/files/tevenesujefojozudile.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2601/4620/files/fapekawubuwugedoma.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8385/7053/files/kiwepigegevoviwekas.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006586.bin
bebbbe397f3bc72d0d9ad0e7ab435fc5d2712ce66cbd01a3b66a0748bd757d9f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6586 5428 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007806.bin
6c3e12bff0b410492b03a1f10cc600f064ad63d188091539984f1e5a79d9e669		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7806 10760 bytes

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