MALICIOUS
564
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204 User Execution
The sample is an RTF document that leverages two critical vulnerabilities: CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation). The presence of OLE object data, including a PE header within hex data, strongly suggests that the document is designed to embed and deliver a secondary executable payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates that the document likely prompts the user to enable content, a common social engineering tactic for malware droppers.
Heuristics 15
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CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
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CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOREquation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
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Equation Editor object class critical RTF_OBJCLASS_EQUATIONObject class 'equation.3' references Equation Editor
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PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEXHex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
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ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6529506-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6529506-0
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEXRTF contains ~1923KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAMRTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordm
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00002b61.bin643162f56be80ce22f79fa1badb429c0196706ddc417f6b0db0b8cdc6e6317f0 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B61 | 961600 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.59, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
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objdata_01_off001f314c.bin3382db8f6b736b12a349df724ee213f8b536038f5c7beb126a29c161b5ef93e5 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F314C | 4183 bytes |
objdata_02_off001f53fa.binc4611fd774a89e42093812e4b8d630b0210a476184df69bc6ffbe2418128f165 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F53FA | 3826 bytes |
objdata_03_off001fe520.bin6e2aea7ea2cc078526bd52a97cd3e0f071a0d34e368f94f41b87a877119743ce |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FE520 | 3546 bytes |
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