RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2a4753214a911701

MALICIOUS

RTF

41.8 KB First seen: 2023-07-18

MD5: a8d3284aa16a97a6d03042d9c564d98d SHA-1: 19e70c31f6c477eec84a87cf45f6817cb518a64b SHA-256: 2a4753214a9117017f1c932f7c4619fc0e6298f3cdef9fe5b857efdc38dd0e34

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely related to the Equation Editor, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005883.bin` `0926aaf7adfdcea93abefeb70a62da758bd96873e495aafd5f480fd739423730`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5883	1511 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.