Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2a3ffa98896e6d3e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.1 KB Created: 2020-09-16 19:23:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: d8cbd50df2abcffc694ccddbb2f25a0a SHA-1: e943f3786198ebb5cefde6f24534c3ce5cc201cf SHA-256: 2a3ffa98896e6d3ec5d7adae70eb1e46c2c9957294f9d638678dd29698b825b7
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a high number of external links, many pointing to potentially malicious redirectors or content farms, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK and PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristics. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that aligns with the malicious redirector. The presence of a callback lure heuristic suggests a social engineering component, aiming to trick the user into interacting further. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=last+day+on+earth+modified+weapons In PDF document text
    • http://seriwe.huffmansflowersofthefield.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739892/jopegutoro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lasiwof.whitecaptions.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740164/18a1fc964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.las-philosophy.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873718/posujelu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kutav.findapartyconsultant.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483065/dexigujebapek-dukimidida-jujejaziro-leregun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.secondstoryhoney.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776077/takidelidobe_nesilogare_lokotajebidumex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://ab7d74ce-4ca8-49e3-b4e7-fd908c6a8aad.filesusr.com/ugd/440e29_f64702803a77443b872eac543ef9b39e.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://398ddbb1-40a2-4286-8990-4715123dd384.filesusr.com/ugd/b5472a_95b307e2180e4bf5918f44992d130ec5.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://f76c1954-71cf-458d-ac78-95820750324e.filesusr.com/ugd/4c7633_26080528414c43b2b31254e04520329e.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://cfcac515-33d2-4fa0-a2c0-742fdc6646cd.filesusr.com/ugd/bba345_b78471969c2c47689c1667c391844277.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/7237/1350/files/ruvipazejolugekivejaverib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7423/1199/files/83423966768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://7cd6f4b4-11fa-4375-9dfe-5f978187b898.filesusr.com/ugd/2f7489_6f9c8da1323b43c895addc60ccad6ee0.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://5e03e9b8-a25b-42cb-a0d3-11e22eb2d534.filesusr.com/ugd/8bf3fc_1ea5075a9645437493d785b8caa3a3f8.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://987fc3fc-872a-4c2e-811b-f4e132088dc4.filesusr.com/ugd/33a16d_3f8ae1c9075d4bfc83b26396b6b852ac.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://dca2b711-d8e5-4f59-9e80-29f29289f117.filesusr.com/ugd/69695d_9241f897b95847789bfbc4640d9e729e.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://25d6b42b-a70c-4f14-ba71-2cd1e771c81d.filesusr.com/ugd/b148e5_a62a824b05ce4d9982e1ab780887761a.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C20 5172 bytes
SHA-256: 8c5f1f5536b66b77a8f419bcf2bb038cf72d3655c800262beebc79610a921b70
font_01_sfnt_off00007d9c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D9C 12228 bytes
SHA-256: 8f9bfd30a28c66b644216d66121697e7aa8a6b4777c8fd5e3e941a01b3260607
font_02_sfnt_off0000a517.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA517 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e