Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 29fad700c459ded7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.46 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-10
MD5: c5f697899764bc6b34991db860088674 SHA-1: d6edf9a691f5d76bae4bf4cc10267c9e39c052c8 SHA-256: 29fad700c459ded7179545c78a2d772607f281d40320e36483feccca19c85e12
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object known to be vulnerable to CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a payload that, when triggered, leads to the execution of a secondary PDF file. The PDF itself contains suspicious findings, including a direct link to a payload, indicating a multi-stage attack designed to download and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
3256028e98f9854c25041d45fd5b31d4dacd28c0150d068b1a85eba0a916b4d2		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000B0797/Ole10NAtIVE 1238 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
5a6fcaea8f21e099ff04bdae3a642e7a2c5bdd6205848a074b22ab143798d4ff		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1529344 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
4f4f2f9368815c6142b6541ad10216440f691579e25f1fbf9632def5c04b6d37		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1508352 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e400.pdf
d1e30068c7864ebfc1c537142fd89c4df4843939ad8792722cfd7db196ba6aff		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE400 1475072 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002d000.pdf
a55170e8e5bf23d6f115a00c5181d99831db1144320e182fb3729b3ddd9507d9		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2D000 1349120 bytes

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