Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 29fa6b1adf01189e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.9 KB Created: 2020-10-27 05:21:19 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 161e341f8d91ead36b1606bdeaddd10d SHA-1: 36a70874475b2ba172257db8c1980e82d4853ecb SHA-256: 29fa6b1adf01189ec2f79223a6e9eb66f2c7e8f454aafe6016fb5b95dbec8beb
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier and contains a large number of embedded links. Several heuristics indicate it is a link farm, with many links pointing to PDFs hosted on disposable domains. One link redirects to a known malicious infrastructure, suggesting a potential for further malicious activity or SEO manipulation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/123?keyword=conflict+in+romeo+and+juliet+act+1 In PDF document text
    • https://rikisuluwujufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452938/bogirisekede_mexelasutezovi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gutugifowofe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606479/6f1312eddc822a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://korodaziso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740443/kupubeluxubajo-fadapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nikuwexipamojag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813731/cdff22c8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guxesawaxogego.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314991/tiripaxekimaroza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/zidebesirolabavo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jobubati.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453688/05335831a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wibugosavuzatug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134349607/2683883.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tukowozurowogof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134440104/vifibenoxopemunab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3e9453b5-a1f6-43b9-9932-c2343cd1d189/keraxurezabawufemebar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/05918db9-6db8-4c37-b19a-c3bc7fa3330c/kisimuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ab8e825e-c2c0-471d-9670-41de6f0b376d/85811131366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b3eb5e60-d181-4be1-b79d-ed634b149e30/titejujuxumuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c51f0ea8-e06c-4f39-b46e-800fe4a7b532/growing_tomatoes_in_florida_panhandle.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006133.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6133 5024 bytes
SHA-256: a8813e290bffc74d20ef3aa6815b1adf9c6e0e9ee71eeca151fa89117728bd67
font_01_sfnt_off0000722b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x722B 10208 bytes
SHA-256: 6f4058388c53fc2fbef3560870293386a1c40ea65520ba59729e042293f94d55
font_02_sfnt_off000094b8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x94B8 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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