Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 29eddce7c15f340f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

119.4 KB Created: 7/16/2004 18:47:28 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via GNU Ghostscript 7.05) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: b050135ac9a1b88845c655e104697253 SHA-1: b3134e224023d27730e9d7ac8edcbae9ecd02772 SHA-256: 29eddce7c15f340f6ba27f0352fa1ddf196e7f65b4921037df29e1d111c1701a
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

This PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is designed to execute an embedded Windows executable payload, which is disguised as a PDF file named 'Demystifying Google Hacks.pdf'. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0', and the PDF itself was detected as 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586'. The primary intent is to deliver and execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Demystifying Google Hacks.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/2BUQ4S0SAW.html In PDF document text
    • http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/6M00H2K5PG.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.zeustech.net/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (Demystifying_Google_Hacks.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.178.54:4444In extracted file (Demystifying_Google_Hacks.pdf)
    • http://www.google.com/remove.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Ring-of-FireIn PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Demystifying_Google_Hacks.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 93 at offset 0x12CA5 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 087f4823fcd73b2bcc2d82c4b904fad42822ee16418d2b02fea970e85a2aa39d
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Demystifying_Google_Hacks.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.178.54:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0094_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 94 at offset 0x1D921 74 bytes
SHA-256: 6bb3bd5b3bdd40d660ad4a57d1c7ff5091a154f84053854cdfbbbc8cdacb1496
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Demystifying Google Hacks", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_014_off0000945d.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x945D 3292 bytes
SHA-256: 4bcdcd50c5691c4928aae85560fc3aa94c7b242135dfc7e1456457ed93d893a5
font_00_sfnt_off00006a36.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6A36 16368 bytes
SHA-256: 1bff7f5cb24a3fb1f0958f533938aceb1c39caeb630131efe2e8fe9eff0e022a
font_02_cff_off00009f58.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x9F58 3160 bytes
SHA-256: 56cfc53c9037d98bfce2bcd89043d8a8fe7cadc6f2ec424decd3b6be65115388
font_03_cff_off0000abfe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xABFE 3854 bytes
SHA-256: 61b289a027ec637e1ad5992c5d66c2de0d707e19194498ccfeccffd24d5ad1a8
font_04_cff_off0000ba5d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xBA5D 3680 bytes
SHA-256: 6243cf430837ec0b1a8687f14fb5f2fd611f1fa1111128769a39c827d1488313
font_05_cff_off0000c7d3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xC7D3 5493 bytes
SHA-256: 744a9c9b3764f42d59d2c9674b70464a73157ec64eedb3cac603e67ae067a929
font_06_cff_off0000db3f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xDB3F 3309 bytes
SHA-256: 5bd3157bb96bf863c391b232c7118c17eecadd23e32ddae130faaca6fd0d9e49
font_07_cff_off0000e947.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xE947 8352 bytes
SHA-256: 234a04b813d6bba9875c19a51f6d2edc697cdfe08cd63a13b0f874bf79e86ffd

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