Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 29c5acb89a33e34b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.2 KB Created: 2022-03-29 09:57:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-05-18
MD5: ac42050d71a617c0fad1143b8ed1ec58 SHA-1: d642b006de4e4923379202a4ad7ce0f7f4969883 SHA-256: 29c5acb89a33e34b9b7520c38240222245d7f2f169cac26f182c9584d308a79e
206 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dadalinukujig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135331358/3219205.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://rikedinodewo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135323941/foluzataguxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pajulabilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134620642/1176506.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://folokugofezoke.weebly.com/uploads/1/4/1/2/141259175/muxatabol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sesuzefodapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815176/4304115.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jotezuzoxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382583/bozerawon-xezutulud-lujakija.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dirasikazeta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379856/7dbdc535be3e6b5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://foxibujabav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508678/pojezosiba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sutukedepebovi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134753024/vubepekanuzameb-lapawifofaruvux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baxawomegofagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815114/sejegeduwesuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xatefokagakutil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108848/eddab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wojasatog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134765175/xosovexusaxer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://komipakokituk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135993761/wevigesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuselusovofose.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164562/wanimojoduz_fakuxawoge_zatozik_vudazifewenuza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fukubumo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016705/sozib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojozojejaxito.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134866115/sufudedapigag-ludebamuvikan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kajinazesutip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134888738/7717088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fuvafejozogixuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134878931/bekef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yoyep.co.za/YmrXLWy8?keyword=what%20is%20the%20best%20bible%20concordance%20appPDF link annotation
    • https://towedesufab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135392656/zodurab-jowexataxofop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000cc16.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000cc16.bin)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cc16.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCC16 17664 bytes
SHA-256: dc354c9e374fa5116205cb036c43341f8a2d706156a73eb5dc77150dfbb1b6bb
font_01_sfnt_off0000fab8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFAB8 10744 bytes
SHA-256: 9aa6923d411b0415aae6eb03d79c2ec820d5a1cf5dd303ce882290ea1d1590ce
font_02_sfnt_off00011322.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11322 16416 bytes
SHA-256: cfa2c3fbce80cc5607e01af033b793d17c57c214fb1d96e845eedea48cccd336