RTF malware analysis — malicious · 29be6d975c70bc49

MALICIOUS

RTF

36.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-14

MD5: 8bfb6ca696d156f81e325f131ec1f7da SHA-1: aa1f95dbebb608af31e8fd779ed9a1693ce98bd4 SHA-256: 29be6d975c70bc49b41888e05e7c2bf4845683f4873c632ade39913e14b04796

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an exploit designed to execute arbitrary code, likely for a secondary payload download.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000042f8.bin` `b1bbc43dfb3923fbdabed38b662ca81e6d0a5adc35a07149b2c3fbfdf049a2c1`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x42F8	1635 bytes

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