Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 299809eb85a84672…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.0 KB Created: 2021-08-30 21:21:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: e4310e62a6dd243bcc447c04860bf89b SHA-1: b0704eb7452e436919ae3c9209dbd3b8466cf657 SHA-256: 299809eb85a846728609b2eb492357fc125bd79bceb6f8d1eceb7495ea5729ff
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document exhibits social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, instructing the user to execute a command via the Run dialog (Win+R). This is a common method to bypass macro restrictions and directly execute malicious code. The presence of numerous external URLs, many hosted on compromised CMS upload directories or disposable domains, suggests a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content or download secondary payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=shortcut+key+for+refresh+in+laptop PDF link annotation
    • http://morgancountyoh.com/userimages/tatapegatosujina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.taxikladis.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070dd5e6f8ce---52943782322.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://leadershipcareer.kr/fckeditor/_upload/file/sovifatetagipilojidip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabuksusu.com/contents//files/12191684249.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://socialchangefactory.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0591f9a4f3e3554187957f3aa78057a7/45877316687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://centronegozi.com/public/rufobuxek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hpx.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e5d3692f506cde92d9503a068987c685/78061928408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lightingdynamics.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4b4ede4a2f17e50a371ac9a0d267fb80/78085532311.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhuizhkj.com/upload_fck/file/2021-5-5/20210505105859780164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thienminhgroup.com/uploads/userfiles/file/lisikugagitedikaso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mtcnx.com/upload/fckimagesfile/17120340117.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cplastik.cz/data/cms/file/defevule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.glasswindowequipment.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aa131d457c745c7e41615f87fbc938b8/647483973.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.saito-ken.jp/userdata/file/vubuliti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://getawaynewzealand.co.nz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094b1da2da1d---tujanazalovamowuwadem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://emilymillerlaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/betusesevejutemo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.kowel.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/1626095309.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.frankcapassoandsons.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609a828b8c785---puzegujuwexixudirerof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://boumqueur-edition.com/upload/fckeditor/file/80216353802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://infoenergie-loire.org/userfiles/file/68117110324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.laterveer-biesenbeek.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/62356495973.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cruiseship.cruises/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5ckub5l9e7999nkgf11s4ofhpb/60101886876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f3c8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF3C8 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010bda.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10BDA 18696 bytes
SHA-256: a99bdbf9bf120d9dbe08161dc09e6c63c78344a946f6a45f2ab82d086bddfb89
font_02_sfnt_off00013c20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13C20 10956 bytes
SHA-256: 223bd215bb4c7174eb7f3cb5cedd7ff2d22a3a6c3c25c35eb1c001b164ddf58e

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.