Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2990e41f6a491ebb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

13.9 KB
MD5: 6b96cac4ad3f96e811537b6f9d0a21e5 SHA-1: 565f9ca4299d441c4a7ea3306ae8c84226968df3 SHA-256: 2990e41f6a491ebb206d9dbe50b64459c5c9ff6789159d191033521edd85e839
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJAUTLINK` heuristics strongly indicates an exploit attempt. This type of attack typically aims to gain initial access by tricking a user into opening a malicious document, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001aa5.bin
78bc2a9ffbb52c6acaeba4a7e2e98d8d9f2d9d030fff513575d71a9682126d64
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AA5 1763 bytes