Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 298677f67432048d

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

122.5 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 278a424872d9b33ba64c679bba333c04 SHA-1: 10439ba2a93f2f6ed956e72c4c5b2d2e0ab6e5d2 SHA-256: 298677f67432048d2d575a90c83c713d5c5d6c6defe8cd25caea2517d55e705f

260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution T1055 Process Injection T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an OLE document with a significant amount of slack space, indicating potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, along with suspicious cmd.exe invocation. These point towards the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The document body itself contains text related to application forms, which serves as a lure.

Heuristics 7

Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC

Reference to WinExec API
Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS

Reference to CreateProcess API
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD

Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY

Reference to LoadLibrary API
Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS

Reference to GetProcAddress API
OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY

OLE file is 125,440 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,308 bytes — 104,132 bytes (83%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC

Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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