Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 297fa52a40df51b6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.6 KB Created: 2021-01-18 00:31:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: bfb788e6b6fbe3e501c8731a0e23385a SHA-1: a69830458b92db012080bc539c0545bc537a6dd3 SHA-256: 297fa52a40df51b60f6dbe1c376d3dbe89986b49c68ac7e724db764e3c5f070e
206 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, identified as a link farm, with a primary URL related to 'Xmeye connection timeout'. This suggests a phishing or SEO spam campaign. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of malicious activity, likely leading to further compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffnew.ru/wb?keyword=xmeye%20connection%20timeout PDF link annotation
    • http://manaluw.iblogger.org/62622011436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wanolugago/iejjHA3/61544385534.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ximazula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738777/6108178.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fajorisovobune.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134752278/domufujifadeborev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1166064.mozfiles.com/files/1166064/31236856189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1200144.mozfiles.com/files/1200144/10467444706.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/winelolibug/kd6gcDL/download_storybeat_pro_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4379049/normal_5fc79034659c2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nebafaveju/1jgibQL/shoot_em_up_movie_download_in_isaimini.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fezulenigi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134485980/22c5e7e28.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mevexobuzur/ip7jFji/71623069436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wodosokereso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407547/bce03d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://zusewijoje.epizy.com/zakonudipuresonuxilusar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://felubumasosazi.epizy.com/10901195872.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d5ee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD5EE 4508 bytes
SHA-256: ff6703b6b393ecedec874d2f2e6db16f00d0c8a06a6e927cc22528c264a330d3
font_01_sfnt_off0000e542.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE542 10796 bytes
SHA-256: f4c980172a16ddbadfcb8262a5571767390d6153e3cd3b1699ebe32035e21adb

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.