Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 297a951d047d377a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

105.9 KB First seen: 2024-10-05
MD5: 93f8cd6440e951545875706461d25854 SHA-1: 789028f40f3a78ffcce107c4677e91b75bac0e6d SHA-256: 297a951d047d377a45195c4a9e3c1c7a3a5b4ac6cc58b8e2c17d3ec7a2f09485
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document. This exploit is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload, hence the high confidence in this attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001677.bin
963a21e3f37f5e2fa6bc11c8de74f4c3b831139c73e1b11c92bf30d0e78d6fea
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1677 2157 bytes