Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2979985975d7f700…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

10.2 KB
MD5: 6bcd24bb0f43203b0eba08dc5a6af5a4 SHA-1: 7ae01bca68a17581b7d8a5a57400543b11e4a29e SHA-256: 2979985975d7f700cdc0dc505f1566bbdf1605ab1d0fc177f7e0f3f6b3c95270
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to achieve code execution. The heuristics indicate the exploitation of the Equation Editor via OLE object activation. This technique allows an attacker to run arbitrary code, typically to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001248.bin
872596dca5bad5dd64389aa226129c2e88f8c7721e2e3e4acdc07f89a7411e66		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1248 1828 bytes

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