Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 29616fda1179e608…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

32.5 KB
MD5: 37ed3bbfbb0f911e90d0a94d2f2c81b2 SHA-1: b80e43b1c399f605ef0ef49894bd8240d3032066 SHA-256: 29616fda1179e6086a8e23aafff235fc4f03705c4f986235fc092f0907ebcc13
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an embedded OLE object, indicating it's likely an exploit carrier. The presence of an embedded OLE object suggests an attempt to deliver a secondary payload, possibly through a macro or other embedded exploit. Without further analysis of the OLE object, the exact delivery mechanism and family remain unclear.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.