Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 295efefcc70ad158…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

82.0 KB Created: 2021-01-20 20:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b47a1ed43578835f4a97996e9b75bc8f SHA-1: 74bed3302c4bf96eb8a23c14fcc7335429ae8705 SHA-256: 295efefcc70ad158b02e92c352eb40475d66a5f57fef43cd13a2f33abbf49d13
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is identified as malicious by ClamAV and exhibits critical heuristics for VBA macro execution, specifically a Document_Open macro and a CreateObject call. The presence of VBA macros suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.87f88707f007f878-OOXML-9981544-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.87f88707f007f878-OOXML-9981544-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
952711b956db61f4507153dad3037176443db77dc181b765cc64474145b08b39
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2069 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
5a2b2f26382bcf787a7fc07777fe24cc9ea93227384732872e328feaf8bf8dae
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 60928 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.