MALICIOUS
220
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
The presence of legacy WordBasic macro virus markers like 'TOOLSMACRO' and the 'AUTOEXEC' and 'AUTOOPEN' keywords strongly indicate a malicious macro embedded within the document. The OLE slack anomaly further suggests the file's structure has been manipulated, a common tactic for obfuscating malicious content. ClamAV detection as 'Win.Trojan.Mark-1' corroborates the malicious nature.
Heuristics 5
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ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Mark-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Mark-1
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Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGEA CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
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Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUSOLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 46,080 bytes but its declared streams total only 26,414 bytes — 19,666 bytes (43%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMSThe file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_office_off00002061.ole |
embedded-office | Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2061 | 37791 bytes |
SHA-256: 6079974613554310383a37c7a4bb59a7298d8dfb8c14288496fa446c18db7a57 |
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embedded_office_off00005c14.ole |
embedded-office | Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x5C14 | 22508 bytes |
SHA-256: f7213603c5270306d4fa7399a505ecb61a4f6ae6505a3c04506a07a9193bcd88 |
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