Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 28fb8a5f8be70e87…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.0 KB Created: 2020-11-08 17:54:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 2bab5eaede069bc00000a2707342162b SHA-1: 771e1e5d7ee968d1f5b65395b6e4a0e35b12239f SHA-256: 28fb8a5f8be70e872f9a6805c4137ca0f254db91de4199c1ed227758f38359da
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and redirect to malicious infrastructure. The primary lure appears to be related to 'hack mobile legends diamond', directing users to a malicious URL. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/123?keyword=hack+mobile+legends+diamond In PDF document text
    • https://sosegesidor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134465043/8797206.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://woxomeze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134498023/kugekuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://towetebofipu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437669/6792826.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jeponiruwapin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776483/008447ab518.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://paseboke.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134432883/parukumimewimi_fawafa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/ratefunerod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suvenalopevoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134510495/ronovoka_rinorirumitono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sakifawabepufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134466371/dasuxowezofuged-pakakin-dixogonep-wutufavejij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gupasozulo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134471060/2086933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://koxokigibobov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134600250/lulof_soxigotarozare.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://digafixi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776371/27555a6cf95.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sigoxavofilaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134697452/3534469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://fidunonip.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/8625666511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jemazejodep/jafifexuxab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rezekine.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/tatojesanawav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f86.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F86 5328 bytes
SHA-256: 87e778621e923bd3144a956acb8a3b0669e259fae058a0b82f9e4b2f1e607ff6
font_01_sfnt_off00007192.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7192 9924 bytes
SHA-256: 26719e917bbdb01c1f501e6758e8fadf28682557a8c134a03796cbeceb078446

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