Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 28dcb0bb32b74dbd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.6 KB Created: 2020-06-04 00:24:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0b473c30a129ea678550e838db29f120 SHA-1: 9682c197cdf580080b59eb0cfa444edfdf696d52 SHA-256: 28dcb0bb32b74dbd1b3a75ad969390fad464d29989ec36808f258b620e722a60
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file was identified as malicious by an ML classifier with high confidence. It contains a large number of external links, a technique often used for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malicious content. The PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic specifically flags this behavior, indicating a link farm hosted on domains like torohouston.com. No scripts were extracted, and the document body contained mostly metadata and repeated URL fragments, reinforcing the link farm nature of the document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://web6.pleasingfood.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874104/130874104.html#physioex+9.1+exercise+7+activity+2+a
    • http://torohouston.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130543368/dozifibe.pdf
    • http://allnationsinsuranceinc.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380625/mewudumiromuj.pdf
    • http://bristolkitchenmakeovers.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604911/73c48.pdf
    • http://jasminemann.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874514/bimotakawirelogok.pdf
    • http://msilver.shop/uploads/1/3/0/5/130539659/82fe8b9686f.pdf
    • http://web6.pleasingfood.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874104/terms.html
    • http://web6.pleasingfood.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874104/dmca.html
    • http://web6.pleasingfood.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874104/policy.html
    • https://tukevorigo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dofitusafuveketex.pdf
    • https://limowuzeram.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/72577344983.pdf
    • https://titukid.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/gujekekimo.pdf
    • https://xejolaxutibu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/7337658698.pdf
    • https://zolukid.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/2237444687.pdf
    • https://sorukog334678404.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/koxonate.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000063d4.bin
ecddb92c7d59fc820f13193b28222b0ebc2599a75fca08856229a2a889a82682		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63D4 10424 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.