Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 28cb3255a1017fb8…

MALICIOUS

RTF

30.8 KB First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 5a355cafe205f42b26bb047636e2163d SHA-1: 3a4859a2382c51b5bde8e1ed98fc88287c8d578b SHA-256: 28cb3255a1017fb8498ff1068dc41a909e3cfd7d76fbcd6af766978c151a6702
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE object data and triggers heuristics for CVE-2017-8759 (SOAP Moniker RCE) and RTF_OBJAUTLINK, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. The presence of a lure to 'Enable Editing' further supports a malicious intent to execute a payload.

Heuristics 7

  • SOAP Moniker — CVE-2017-8759 (SOAP WSDL RCE) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8759
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the SOAP Moniker — CVE-2017-8759 (SOAP WSDL RCE) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Downloader.CVE_2017-6336326-3 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Downloader.CVE_2017-6336326-3
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000001b8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B8 2600 bytes
SHA-256: fbe71a20beafce43d6f2db6c65d792754ea45528e59641b454a98bb730e412ea