Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 289b14f006ef34ac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.9 KB Created: 2020-10-31 09:33:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: a0c5db5a5c41737e0e36908cda0400c2 SHA-1: 03da9f155606022f94581f736f9a7ddc4ec80407 SHA-256: 289b14f006ef34ac0ea19693dd5b8e59332837992eb795a43c5a1d074128f082
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF is designed as a lure, masquerading as a "Hobby Lobby weekly ad PDF" to trick users into clicking embedded links. The primary link directs to a malicious redirector, while others form a link farm hosted on disposable infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly indicates malicious intent, and the structure suggests it's part of a broader SEO-based spam campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/wb?keyword=hobby%20lobby%20weekly%20ad%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://varipejat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739080/rewininakov_gideb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fuparududewon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856041/renixi_paxudejumag_xisexunuvero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://meboguvogo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437667/gakunejipurukale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panirosarukiza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134132539/nuvafigozasol-nolasilawawexem-junatasevatun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vosaxoro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134469305/movewa-zumawiriguzonim-mewipufodi-pafiden.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pepisukuwen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606293/pokudopun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ravidaxixow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315840/5258306.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/8066/1189/files/who_wrote_deuteronomy_31.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/9710/2238/files/free_movies_and_tv_shows_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0def4ea3-f900-4b94-af75-54f58f8b04bc/47998590735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/6671/8906/files/administrative_medical_assisting_6th_edition_workbook_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9b169069-cb54-4c37-a57c-90f667d8e18d/tsi_assessment_secrets_study_guide_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cc6efdcc-4022-451c-a339-1be744aa0c30/32272905102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/6255/8361/files/nubawamugukuzupubadomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006ea7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EA7 4676 bytes
SHA-256: 4b74dadd43a79ba8f1bd411dca37741d1d995a92991926b8e776c5170b54eaee
font_01_sfnt_off00007eaa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7EAA 11208 bytes
SHA-256: d980dae71568689cca0aeba17d4aaa09c9b885acd09c050751f9d3efcd77c40c
font_02_sfnt_off0000a4c5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA4C5 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71

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