Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 28841052d5d8c37c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB
MD5: a530bf5851630994e8596611d2f0f187 SHA-1: d8b10c6391e5434584f3003aa1f9a8ddde1387f7 SHA-256: 28841052d5d8c37cddeef057453c28f75e0ae5ab74464efc142c177d1e8e0924
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious PDF

The sample is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The PDF structure indicates the presence of XFA forms and embedded scripts, which are common vectors for this type of exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
7733d556c8d543693c50e4ac221b73a53a85ec3022c06b4a2b672109cc78aded
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 80319 bytes