Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 287eb36906bc3772…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

38.0 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-12-14
MD5: 3bdd47ecacd1bbb252a42d75a2a11a36 SHA-1: fad054f74067f898708f81ab08b90bb8b04e1729 SHA-256: 287eb36906bc37720104618af2cba08d20ed6841de18d568e8ad136a1828aa84
402 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The Workbook_Open macro is obfuscated and uses GetObject to instantiate the dangerous WScript.Shell COM class. It then executes a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a second-stage payload from the reconstructed URL: https://bitbucket.org/!api/2.0/snippets/newwork123social/nEKyxr/a61d4ebfb3003e6676a33bf1abee8dea1636e114/files/methewtext.txt. The PowerShell command itself is heavily obfuscated.

Heuristics 10

  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • VBA instantiates a dangerous COM class by CLSID critical OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_DANGEROUS
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate an execution/scripting-capable COM class by its raw CLSID, avoiding the CreateObject ProgID that name-based detection keys on.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bitbucket.org/!api/2.0/snippets/newwork123social/nEKyxr/a61d4ebfb3003e6676a33bf1abee8dea1636e114/files/methewtext.txt

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
37464a0536efaa0e31f15e6f711b0723d41b43c676cf08389226f051d7e81151		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2994 bytes

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