Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2875b9f0a86fef0c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

91.3 KB First seen: 2023-05-19
MD5: a35c4b4d5131700109a8bed5fc99f4cf SHA-1: c445726dd962f9eb2771041db5c2f10f65fc3cc3 SHA-256: 2875b9f0a86fef0c523c249447532a8324f028dcdbb10f5762a2ce16456e6cb1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is activated via \objupdate, exploiting a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The specific exploit used is identified as RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000c3d.bin
3ad299207c4a2e443d290dcf98fd917d7014bc9d761afabf205d8be7fae22049		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC3D 26113 bytes

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