Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2862b8cfa5ac11cf…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

784.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: ca083dfa45680218ce62d3713379b69e SHA-1: 8ac502eb60801067db2576e090c8f83e80d69c75 SHA-256: 2862b8cfa5ac11cf4bb337e5015f0217adc0f01efa73d1bc2330d59fab367063
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_8759` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. No specific malware family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with a document-based exploit delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000bbdfe.bin
9a9a9b5167040b501ee7a674ae61a1f230cb675c9a2184b12d460a6fd575fa40		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBBDFE 3739 bytes

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