Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 285009db40cb9359…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

126.4 KB Created: 2017-10-31 17:20:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-01-11
MD5: f1d110bf029443744f3209ac37377035 SHA-1: a05861ef2196a30e362a4381b05d1da451fbfe67 SHA-256: 285009db40cb93594696bab4b20dd45b33aed27a34098d52ee94978666a8715a
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV with multiple high and critical heuristic firings indicating embedded OLE objects and extracted artifacts. One embedded OLE object contains a URL, http://dotecnia.cl/kjsdch7346, which is likely used to download a second-stage payload. The presence of a .lnk file within the OLE package further suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dotecnia.cl/kjsdch7346 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: 1f94ed462c8e17c4381b4e121c187204692b89b5d536c7acad72a6fb22ee5001
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6365338-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 1990 bytes
SHA-256: 054bb4164dd5d6adac25d2acc88ff73a3ee01ecb0c476a0daf2ec122786e559f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00_6.lnk ole-package-payload OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native payload: display_name=; full_path=C:\Users\1\AppData\Local\Temp\6.lnk; temp_path=; def_file= 1765 bytes
SHA-256: f28f8f2c5e9242173979e12852b4d04edc4843b364bd4b428c0dbb828cc1e0c9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5372 bytes
SHA-256: ba6b76df952256d06c6b2cc8ec3cbaa9209b0a241b4fd6194a69d0c228746a5f

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