Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 284d7db37a7c0921…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.22 MB
MD5: 5e5049bd28483cfdc82402a148ad3ba2 SHA-1: 990fd507c5fbc0d67901efc9bd0d31445e16db1b SHA-256: 284d7db37a7c0921dc821da9918971bed9d3d3aadf94629c6afbbe65fe37767d
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as Equation Editor exploits. This indicates the file is designed to deliver a payload by leveraging a known vulnerability within the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office. The presence of multiple embedded OLE objects further supports its role as an exploit carrier.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.