Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2845d4f447a3197d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.2 KB Created: 2021-06-04 01:04:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-13
MD5: 0aa61f9a963294c49ad9fa75d808e8a4 SHA-1: 5d4039e1c7c61799359d06f65adb8dd4754ec6e5 SHA-256: 2845d4f447a3197da224c72f37460a4c1ad1b933e79f140cbaff4d26d96e03e0
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, suggesting a link farm or phishing lure. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards a tactic of redirecting users to potentially malicious sites, possibly for credential harvesting or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/pbw?utm_term=curso+de+aleman+desde+cero+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4501770/normal_60116d6daab49.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mikiwugatuvul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135318334/ee5f972214141c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopepikenaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134652119/lowudis_nonipe_jebunu_jazijusoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4420019/normal_5fc8354a2bed5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4485569/normal_605fb67e1472c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4453329/normal_5fce453417907.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baresifesej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131831/purug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://devoligoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/7/5/137509872/sirulafewufifokufak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guboriratuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235556/zosuxotumajibe-xiximevuxab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wadezadoli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130970015/rowut_napukilos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368496/normal_5ffa11162ea76.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nizakibete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134386075/3271102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/13e7af59-219b-4507-90b5-f5649e8f007b/logic_pro_x_book.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pugaxigodaka.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144462981/73302795720.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ziludezubeju.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144459942/dajovejazamotewamimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e64e0a2f-6b9e-4bde-8487-b91ac6c62301/kenmore_model_417_washer_dryer_combo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8242b66b-bf44-482f-9c91-7da7e69ef778/pipiwiketu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ridelox.pbworks.com/f/what_is_a_nccer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/83a6ea99-5595-4288-8c92-6ea3cee827ba/32167124054.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kirozatijawu.pbworks.com/f/transformar_500_metros_quadrados_em_hectares.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9b2f01eb-06e0-48d3-98fa-d312114b1d13/can_you_use_your_own_modem_and_router_with_fios.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6630e328-7d2b-40ca-8be6-19dc9352f021/33060429730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6449ac66-995b-4035-974f-de71ee2fd719/what_boots_do_the_marines_wear.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/60bc7ed2-c680-49e9-8809-337d05efbb93/63761048049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nidibewuzi.pbworks.com/f/gabayadii_abwaan_hadraawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000100e2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100E2 5208 bytes
SHA-256: d31a9071370a9ccf51fd6e8731d28818b4d910ed091a4d6407ead244a80a19c0
font_01_sfnt_off0001127d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1127D 10736 bytes
SHA-256: 04c9192ac8ae42cdbb7d2579b8d32006a4e60271e8bf0e1157ea6a62d0a56e52

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