Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 283742598be3dc30…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.2 KB
MD5: 1c62c5a8ae37ae8298d9e6bea1b754ab SHA-1: 5f8885bf76a940e3e4a16caba33c22d2fae23db5 SHA-256: 283742598be3dc3043a445b3cee47df1f14b032d4e250ca778ced6b4e82fd19d
72 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file is encrypted and contains JavaScript, as indicated by the PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS and PDF_JAVASCRIPT heuristics. The embedded JavaScript stream, named javascript_obj0009_000.js, is likely responsible for decrypting and executing the malicious payload. The exact nature of the payload is obscured by the encryption, but the presence of JavaScript suggests an attempt to bypass static analysis and deliver a secondary stage. The PDF_EMBEDDED heuristic also indicates that the file may contain other embedded artifacts.

Heuristics 5

  • Encrypted PDF carries /JS — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JS). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Additional-actions dictionary low PDF_AA
    PDF defines /AA (Additional Actions) that references an executable action (JS/JavaScript/Launch/SubmitForm) — can auto-trigger on document or widget events. Form-field calc/format/validate/keystroke handlers in legitimate interactive forms commonly fire this, so it is reported as a low-weight signal; weaponised auto-execution is flagged by stronger rules (PDF_OPENACTION, encrypted-with-JS, etc.)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
48187e5f27b35932386917be4c948ca70386be52b176eb24e7a7e4dcbaa27967
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x51A 192 bytes