Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27f88e777b998f38…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.1 KB Created: 2020-04-07 07:16:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: e6968c732a1913dc4e4b3b6068e09fce SHA-1: 3ab31b556f354519df62401906b7d5dce51d185e SHA-256: 27f88e777b998f38de0ac02431c0052b214762d61235ce112b2ca80c249bd5fb
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, pointing to various PDF files hosted on different domains. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body itself is largely unreadable binary data, but it does contain some of the URLs. The primary attack pattern appears to be the creation of a link farm, likely to manipulate search engine results or to distribute further malicious content via the linked PDFs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://vartanpainting.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130603803/130603803.html#pse+mini+burner+bow+strings
    • http://alisonbrucejeweller.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378795/1960413.pdf
    • http://ikdc.de/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588687/1787470.pdf
    • http://avoiceinthefight.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380275/zekege-gifitivesusap.pdf
    • http://labellainteriorsvenice.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130273761/3530794.pdf
    • http://inclusionforallstudents.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323750/tavikubarej_nulolu.pdf
    • http://paulajlay.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639882/xexugugopu.pdf
    • http://alitiumweltservice.de/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452753/6902231.pdf
    • http://nonakaconsulting.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130271244/5691028.pdf
    • http://alex82.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406275/majoke.pdf
    • http://katsdisabilitycareservices.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483198/57543d9b2202fb7.pdf
    • http://thegnarlyroot.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620791/doxibi_dererab_wibiwiwu.pdf
    • http://kydairy.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130547078/metutefaxutinilim.pdf
    • http://norjenes.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588833/1235652.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008424.bin
6f5b1c514aaccc871860c0c2fb0b17affd21da2bc3b67145a9b5b6285e274e27		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8424 8204 bytes

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